TIME for Japan to prime its weapons and sail out into the world again? The idea brings howls of protest, not least in Japan itself, where popular attachment to the country’s post-war “peace” constitution is strong. Yet Japan’s parliament will soon consider a series of bills to allow its modestly named Self-Defence Forces to give America a bit more support in regional hot-spots and to play a more active part in UN peacekeeping. There is even serious talk of revising the constitution itself, though that is for the longer term. More immediately, the planned new role is limited?no combat duty involved?but useful in a region with an awkward balance to keep between America, China, Japan, a still divided Korea, and Russia, and no criss-crossing alliances to take the strain. Yet, if a shooting war ever breaks out in this uneasy neighbourhood, Japan will need to stand ready to do a lot more than pass the ammunition, unless it is ready to bid farewell to its security alliance with America.

Although Japan’s peacekeeping plans may be trickier to reconcile with its current reading of the constitution?self-defence is an inherent right of all countries, but collective military action is still deemed unacceptable for Japan?few outsiders would balk these days at Japan doing more for the UN. Its soldiers will not be looking for frontline trouble; they will merely be better equipped and authorised to defend themselves (and therefore less of a burden to their comrades) if attacked. Meanwhile Japan knows that, if it wants a permanent Security Council seat, it needs to share in the responsibilities?and risks?of upholding the council’s decisions. But, such UN-approved duties aside, is it so obvious that a militarily more active Japan would be a boon to East Asia?

Those with bitter memories of Japanese aggression during the 1930s and the second world war were understandably reassured by the old cold-war arrangement: America promised to defend Japan (thereby removing the need for Japan to beef up its own armed forces too much) in return for the right to station American troops deterringly close to potential conflict zones. The one-sided nature of this alliance rankled little when Japan could shelter, one among many, behind America’s global shield. As Japan prospered under America’s protection, it prided itself on being a “civilian” power: using its trade and aid to encourage stability in the region.

But such cold-war comforts are no longer on offer. With the threat of Soviet aggression long gone, America has justifiably lost interest in bearing Asia’s many military burdens alone to the benefit of others, including Japan. Hence the need for Japan to be seen to be doing more. The proposed new guidelines would enable Japan to assist more with repairs and logistics (including helping to deliver American ammunition, but not to supply its own) in regional conflicts beyond Japan’s own waters, though not directly in combat zones. Its warships could help with sanctions-monitoring and mine-sweeping. Its ships and aircraft would be able to rescue stranded nationals.

This is scarcely blood-curdling stuff, and the least Japan can do, given that much of its trade passes through the sea-lanes close to East Asia’s trouble-spots, from North Korea and Taiwan to the disputed Spratly Islands. Japan’s proposed new duties also fall far short of the “militarism” with which China likes to charge Japan. China is angry that America might call on Japan for such help in a future tiff over Taiwan, which China claims as its own. But it is not Japan that has been flexing its military muscle. Three years ago some of the missiles China fired into the shipping lanes near Taiwan to intimidate the islanders before their first democratic presidential election landed worryingly close to outlying Japanese islands. Meanwhile the military threats spat out by a hostile North Korea are directed at Japan, not just South Korea and the American troops there.

Soldiering on with democracy
Which is why, in a real shooting crisis, Japan’s planned new role would scarcely suffice. If China and America were to come to blows over Taiwan, or North Korea were to lash out militarily at South Korea, Japan would still be able to do little more than hold America's coat and help cart away its casualties. That experience could well shatter support in America for an alliance that provides the cornerstone both of Japan’s security and of East Asia’s stability. Which is why Japan’s parliament needs to pass the new guidelines and then take a fresh look at the bar on collective defence. It would take years to redraft the constitution. However, the relevant war-renouncing parts rightly did not stop Japan building its Self-Defence Forces and, if its politicians so decide, need not bar Japan from playing a more active role in collective self-defence (a right of sovereign states under the UN charter).

Might such a rethinking of Japan’s military role someday be taken as a licence to maraud? Put it another way: if Japan were in marauding mood, no weasel words in its constitution would deter it. Of course, it would reassure the neighbours if Japan were more open and contrite about its military past, as Germany has been. Meanwhile, precisely because of Japan’s military past, its government needs to explain to opponents at home, as Germany’s did, that defending democratic values sometimes, regrettably, requires military means. Most Japanese would rather put off such difficult issues until a mind-clearing crisis comes along. But, as Germany has found, doing more dangerous military duties takes careful peacetime preparation and practice. By crisis-time it is already too late.

There will always be understandable doubts about a militarily more active Japan. But there are two greater dangers. One is that, come the next real crisis, one of East Asia’s best-equipped armed forces will mostly stand aside and watch. The second is that if, as a result, Japan’s alliance with the United States did fall apart, Japan would have little choice but to arm itself more aggressively, including possibly with nuclear weapons. Better for Japan to learn to work more closely with the Americans than to sail forth alone.