New U.S. Thinking Needed on N. Korea
by Tom Coyner
JoongAng Daily
June 22, 2010
A
recent report on North Korea by the Council on Foreign Relations
reeks of American arrogance.
The list of nearly two dozen contributors and reviewers reads like a
“Who’s Who” among U.S. North Korean watchers, including Victor Cha,
Charles Curtis, Nicholas Eberstadt, Robert Gallucci, Marcus Noland,
Don Oberdorfer, Evans Revere and Scott Snyder.
What I found remarkable, even a bit exasperating, was how
unremarkable the white paper stated what is essentially the same old
hat of U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea.
To give you an example, the crux of the paper lays out four options:
(1) explicit acquiescence of North Korea as a nuclear state, (2)
containment and management of the status quo, (3) a rollback to
denuclearization as was attempted by the Clinton administration, and
(4) regime change. The report dismisses options No. 1 and 4, looks
at No. 2 as being the current Obama policy, and recommends No. 3 as
an aggressive “carrots and sticks” approach to force Pyongyang back
to the six-party talks.
While the paper delineates options No. 2 and 3, all No. 3 really is option No. 2 with more aggressive diplomacy; whereas one may
argue that option No. 2 is a laid-back version of No. 3. In other
words, what we have among the four options are two impractical
extremes in either accepting North Korea as a nuclear power or
working toward removing the current regime.
The other two familiar options seem more like a feckless Twiddledee
and Twiddledum, separated only by differences in attitude. And to be
fair, some of the above-named signatories expressed skepticism in
the report’s addendum that option No. 3, a rollback, is likely to
succeed.
What I find depressing in these findings seems to be the feeble best
that this group of highly intelligent and experienced intellectuals
can formulate. I highlight this report only because of the prestige
that surrounds the CFR and the reputations of the authors. I
naturally wonder if this is the best the U.S. can do.
The problem is that the whole exercise, including the report’s four
U.S. policy options, is essentially formulated from an American
perspective without adequate regard as to how the North Koreans view
the same matters.
Not that I have any sympathy for Pyongyang, but the report reeks of
American arrogance in that it takes a solid, singular view of the
world and entertains only options that jibe with a singular
all-American perspective.
Rather, I would like to see the same intellectuals - or perhaps
others of similar caliber - consider the same matter in a four-step
approach before setting out foreign policy options:
(1) Specifically, there needs to be serious consideration of how the
North Koreans view current realities - without caveats representing
the American perspective.
(2) Using the North Korean viewpoint as a starting point rather than
a side perspective, American policy makers need to consider how the
North Korean perspective translates into what the North Korean
leadership feels, thinks, fears and hopes.
(3) Given Pyongyang’s perspective, together with their emotional and
intellectual interpretation of the same, American policy makers
should ponder what the fundamental needs of the Pyongyang regime are
- again, exclusively from the North Korean perspective.
(4) Finally, given the first three considerations - North Korean
perspectives, interpretations and requirements, the Americans should
look at the current set of demands made by North Korea, determining
which are significant enough to be addressed in earnest and which
are likely being made for essentially propaganda purposes.
Considering that something like the above may not have been done so
far, it is difficult to see how dissimilar or comparable the
conclusions derived from this kind of analysis may be with those the
CFR report distilled.
But even if the options and considerations from my suggested
framework end up being similar to those of the CFR, how U.S.
diplomats approach North Korea could be refreshingly different if
the positioning of initiatives is more empathetic than what we have
seen so far.
Please understand that I’m not advocating some kind of
“touchy-feely” form of diplomacy. Empathy can be starkly different
from sympathy. But at least with empathy there is less chance of
both sides talking past each other.
Moreover, with this kind of empathetic consideration, new options
may be possibly discovered - either unilaterally or, conceivably,
through discussions with Pyongyang.
But in any case, to restate my disappointment, I’m getting tired of
reading and hearing the same cast of characters pontificating off
the same tried and failed platform.
The fact old wine has been poured yet again into a new bottle by the
CFR is unimpressive.
For all the fees and salaries this crowd pulls down, they really
should have done a much better job than what they produced earlier
this month.
We already have a good idea of what doesn’t work. Alternative,
creative strategies are already past due.
*The writer is president of Soft Landing Consulting and vice
president of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.