Understanding the Korea-U.S. Alliance
Many here believe the Korean army is forced to participate in U.S. military activities. This is simply not the case.
By Tom Coyner
JoongAng Daily
April 6 & 13, 2009
(a two-part series)

Given that it has been almost a year without significant anti-American demonstrations, this may be a good time to disclose some surprising realities in United States-Korea relations. Otherwise, in the heat of future demonstrations, the following could be misconstrued as some kind of knee-jerk defense by an American. So, allow me to try to set up and knock down some misconceptions about the South Korea-U.S. relationship.

Myth: Anti-Americanism is a significant force within the Korean political and social environment. Reality: While there is a core of die-hard anti-American Koreans who have adopted this ideology for whatever reason, almost all participants in anti-American demonstrations are not anti-American. Rather they tend to be anti-ruling class. At the same time, Koreans are acutely sensitive to any sign their government is kowtowing to the U.S. on any given issue, but seem to be less so when their government makes a concession to most other countries.

Why so?

Attacking the foreign partner of the elite is infinitely safer while still pressing home the same demands. During the years of the prior authoritarian governments, taking on the Republic of Korea’s government was risky business. Also, during most of the republic’s history, the government has been ruled by the conservatives who are generally perceived to represent the interests of the rich. Given the upper class’s business ties with America, the South Korean government has often been accused of being the Americans’ government. So, demonstrating against America can be a convenient foil, due to America’s extremely close relationship with the Korean establishment.

Myth: America is responsible for the division of Korea.

 Reality: In a sense, this myth is true since had the U.S. not rushed to South Korea’s defense during the Korean War, the country would have been unified. But from a broader view this is a myth. For example, the liberation of Korea from the Japanese was an accident.

Even the American Forces’ role was directly insignificant other than forcing the Japanese government and its military to globally surrender. For 35 years, Korea had not politically existed, having been absorbed into Japan as a colony from 1910. During the closing days of the Second World War, American senior commanders are said to have had to look in an atlas to determine Korea’s location. The Soviet Union, belatedly and cynically leveraging the principles of the Cairo Declaration, declared war on Japan, a few days after Hiroshima’s atom bombing, rushing troops into Manchuria and later northern Korea. Hoping for nationwide free elections, the U.S. agreed with the Soviets for a temporary division of the peninsula. After repeated U.S. efforts to reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. on a formula for pan-Korea elections and unification, the elections were held in the South, but were never held in the North. In fact, in all but its formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was up and running prior to Aug. 15, 1948.

Myth: The American government and, by extension, the U.S. Army control the government and military of the Republic of Korea.

Reality: Except for the three-year period of the U.S. military occupation following World War II, the Republic of Korea has maintained independence, often bordering on defiance, from the United States.

During the Korean War, the autonomy of the ROK government with its Army from the UN Command and the U.S. government was obvious when then President Syngman Rhee released POWs rather than forcing their repatriation to the communists as the UN had agreed at Panmunjeom. Earlier, in September 1950, the ROK Army’s chief of staff Lieutenant General Chung Il-kwon told President Rhee that he thought he needed UN Forces’ approval to send his troops north of the 38th Parallel. The ROK general was curtly told by Rhee that, as Korean Army chief of staff, he should obey the Korean president. “I gave General MacArthur authority over the Korean Army temporarily. If I want to take it back, I can take it back today.”

Myth: The American government and its military have had at least a tacit if not a complicit involvement in political coups.

Reality: In all cases, the Americans have been given too much credit for possible involvement in Korean internal affairs.

 For example, prior to Park Chung Hee’s May 16, 1961 bloodless takeover, the U.S. military didn’t take reports of an impending coup seriously. The ROK Army chief of staff had assured American generals that the situation could be handled. When the rebellion did occur, the Americans were caught off guard.

To further complicate matters, partially as a lack of confidence on the Korean side, after Park’s coup, some Korean academics felt that Koreans couldn’t have done it alone, so it must have been managed by the Americans. This pattern has been frequently replicated throughout the South’s history.

In the subsequent “creeping coup” by Chun Doo-hwan in 1979-80, the American military was again left feeling their trust with their Korean counterparts had been violated. The Korean military had violated the strict procedures of the Combined Forces Command. U.S. General John Wickham was reportedly irate that Chun Doo-whan and Roh Tae-woo had moved troops from Roh’s vital front line Ninth Division into Seoul on Dec. 12, 1979, outside of proper process, in flagrant violation of CFC procedures.

Trust is strategically important between the two armies, since trust is the glue that holds a consolidated control together in the defense of a nation. In other words, the Americans have felt a crisis of confidence about their ability to defend Korea from external attack whenever ROK military commanders have taken unilateral and unexpected actions for political reasons.

Some Koreans have rationalized these military actions, such as during the coups, to have been “domestic matters.” The Americans have acknowledged that reality, but as one former CFC commander observed, “Either you have operational control or you don’t.”

Nonetheless, the American side has always understood that operational control for the mission of defense against attack from the North does not give the Americans the right to interfere in Korean internal affairs.

Myth: The U.S. Army has ultimate authority over Korean units assigned to the Combined Forces Command.

Reality: Since 1978, the CFC has been accountable to a joint military committee that gets its authority from both U.S. and South Korean national command authorities.

The Korean units assigned to the CFC are designated by the Korean side and can be withdrawn by South Korea at any time simply by notification. The CFC commander cannot refuse such notification. All he can do is point out the impact it may have on the performance of his mission.

These points have not been well understood by most Koreans or most Americans. Neither have they been well explained. When U.S. officials stated their position publicly in 1980, they were stymied by martial law and censorship. Subsequently there was little effort to set the record straight because of the priority accorded to stability.

In other words, despite a technological gap, the relationship between the two sides has been much more equal than is publicly imagined. But to be fair, as of today, not only does a U.S. four-star general command CFC (with a Korean four-star deputy), but U.S. two-star generals head up the most important staff sections - C3 (operations and training, the primary war-fighting team) and C5 (plans, policy and strategy) - each with one-star Korean deputies.

But most Korean officers seem quite comfortable with that, realizing as they do that their hierarchical system and relatively rigid training simply do not equip them to react swiftly and flexibly to events and situations as CFC would have to in case of hostilities. Thus, the persistent opposition to wartime operational control transfer by 2012 from so many retired Korean generals and officers, as well as from other conservative groups.

However, we should note that the U.S. Army continuously maintains the lead in cutting-edge technology, sophisticated command and control procedures, air power, and, thanks to Iraq and Afghanistan, comes here “battle-hardened.” All of which makes the perception of the South Korean Army operating under the U.S. Army very much a reality, despite legal technicalities. But, as noted above, come 2012, much of this will change.

At times I have wondered if some politicians have found it advantageous to allow the public to remain ignorant of the evolving complexities of the relationship. It could be advantageous for Korean politicians to tacitly give the impression to their public that they have less power than they actually possess. Being “under the thumb of Big Brother” gives Korean politicians a plausible rationale to suggest they have no other choice but to do what may be unpopular.

Of course, this potential misleading of the public brings along with it the liability of Koreans understandably jumping to the wrong conclusions during populist movements - such as during last year’s anti-mad cow demonstrations.

 Myth: The U.S. government at least tacitly backed the South Korean military’s suppression of the 1980 Gwangju uprising.

Reality: Many Koreans assume that the U.S. had excellent intelligence about what was happening in their country. Actually, the Americans have proven to be remarkably uninformed time and again. In the case of Gwangju, the American government had little accurate knowledge of what was happening, other than a general awareness that there was significant civil unrest in that regional capital.

In fact, the U.S. government did not understand until Monday, May 19, 1980 what had happened over the weekend or why there should be reports of 100,000 people in the streets. The U.S. Peace Corps at the time ordered its volunteers out of Gwangju. But some of the male volunteers refused to leave and, on several occasions, were seen physically shielding demonstrators with their bodies from army troops.

Meanwhile, back in Seoul, things were made even murkier for the U.S. government with the Korean government’s news blackout. In other words, it took over a day for the U.S. government and its military to understand that violence had broken out on Gwangju’s streets on the morning of Sunday, May 18. Contrary to many people’s perceptions, the Korean units from the CFC had been withdrawn earlier than the Gwangju events - not suddenly, just before the government’s response to the Gwangju civil unrest.

In other words, Korean units had already been withdrawn in response to the ongoing demonstrations in Seoul some time prior to the Gwangju incident. Here again, the Korean public, lacking knowledge of the relationship between CFC and the Korean military, tended to assume that U.S. officials supported Korean Army operations in Gwangju.

Myth: South Korea is forced by the U.S. government to accept the stationing of U.S. forces on the peninsula.

Reality: The presence of U.S. Forces Korea is entirely at the pleasure of the Korean government. As demonstrated in the case of the Philippines in 1992, and more recently in Kyrgyzstan, it only takes a request by the host country’s national government to send the U.S. military packing.

* * *

 So where does this place the Korea-U.S. relationship? No alliance can guarantee there will be no problems between friendly countries, but a good alliance can provide a means of solving problems and dealing with common threats. More than many people realize, the two countries stand together as equals, and the U.S. recognizes and encourages the increasingly significant, multidimensional role Korea plays on the peninsula, in the region, and in the world.

The leadership of both countries would to well to better explain the benefits both sides derive from the present relationship and the benefits that will accrue to both from continued, close cooperation.
*The writer is the president of a technology sales and marketing firm, Soft Landing Consulting (www.softlandingkorea.com).