Anti-Americanization of South Korea
By Robert J. Fouser
The Korea Herald (Op-Ed page)
October 23, 2002

For cynics, North Korea's confession that it has continued to pursue nuclear weapons despite the 1994 agreement renouncing its nuclear program came as no surprise because it confirmed their running hypothesis that the North cannot be trusted. For optimists, the confession came as a tremendous letdown because it cast doubt on their efforts to reduce tension on the peninsula through engagement with the North. The cynics are now ascending as the optimists scramble for cover. North Korea knows this, of course, which explains why Kim Young-nam, North Korea's titular head of state, offered to negotiate with the United States if it dropped its "hostile policy" toward North Korea.

To survive, North Korea must divide the nations around it as it tries to strengthen itself internally. Reforming the economy is one way of strengthening itself; pursuing nuclear weapons is another. Conversely, doing nothing exacerbates the long decline and deepening isolation that began in the late 1980s. Economic reform and nuclear weapons are not related in most nations, but North Korea is not your average nation.

A little history will help explain the link between economic reform and nuclear weapons in North Korea. The nuclear weapons program was started under Kim Il-sung first as a means to achieve hegemony over South Korea. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea shifted focus from hegemony over the South to survival. Kim Il-sung's sudden death in 1994 brought Kim Jong-il to power at a time of growing crisis. To promote himself as the legitimate heir, Kim Jong-il had to address the need for security, which explains his interest in continuing the nuclear program that his father had started (or at least approved).

After three years of mourning and living under the shadow of his father, Kim turned his attention to economic reform. The economic crisis and the election of Kim Dae-jung in 1997 presented him with a unique opportunity to begin the process of economic reform by reaching out to South Korea. Economic reform requires a certain degree of openness and takes time to show results, both of which carry risk. Continuing the nuclear weapons program gives North Korea the confidence that it can close the doors and rely on military strength should economic reforms create social and political instability. The precedent of German reunification and the continuing flow of refugees to China are constant reminders of what instability can bring.

To enhance its sense of security, North Korea tried (and succeeded) to create divisions among its neighbors. Such divisions make it difficult to develop a united front against the North on security matters. It would like diplomatic relations with the Japan and the United States, but it also benefits from creating discord among South Korea, Japan, and America because divisions among the countries help to isolate and weaken Seoul. A weaker South Korea will continue to engage in economic cooperation without pushing for concessions on security matters, thus giving North Korea more time and room to maneuver.

The relationship between South Korea and the United States is of particular concern because the past five years have witnessed the de facto anti-Americanization of South Korea. A look at the reader comments on articles on Internet sites of Korean newspapers reveals widespread, at times intense, hatred of the United States. To these opinionated netizens, Washington, not Pyongyang, is the problem because it is an "evil empire" bent on dividing and weakening Korea. Their opinions are no doubt multiplied many times over in the murmur of private conversations around the country.

The anti-Americanization of South Korea has reached such a degree that it gives the North subtle leverage over the South. On matters of Korean security, South Korea should take the lead in pressing the North to abandon its nuclear weapons program. In engaging with the North, it should take the lead in proposing a reduction of military tension in exchange for economic interaction. And, it should take the lead in encouraging the North to embrace basic human rights.

South Korea's position is weakened, however, as long as a significant number of its own people believe that the United States, not North Korea, is the bigger threat. Seen in this light, Kim Young-nam's statement is the latest example of the leverage that North Korea now has over the South because it frames America as a "hostile" bully. South Korean politicians, particularly the optimists, are wary of taking a hard line toward the North because doing so puts them on the same side as the United States, and the government's confused response so far reflects this wariness.

Stemming the anti-Americanization of South Korea is something that only South Koreans can do. A good place to start would be to inquire into why policy disagreements contribute to anti-Americanization in Korea but remain policy disagreements in other countries. If French or German newspapers offer netizens a chance to comment on articles, many comments would no doubt be critical of American policy, but few would refer to the United States and Americans in derogatory and hateful language. Because national security and anti-Americanization are inextricably linked in South Korea, a rigorous inquiry into how legitimate disagreements are processed to support the cause of anti-Americanization is long overdue.

The writer is an associate professor at Kyoto University in Japan. His e-mail address is heungbob@hanmail.net. - Ed.