The United States and North Korea have staved off the collapse of their 1994 nuclear accord by reaching an agreement that gives the U.S. access to a North Korean underground military facility. But critics of President Bill Clinton's policy toward North Korea see the deal as another example of naive and dangerous appeasement.

As former U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry shuttles between Washington and Asia to review that policy, it looks increasingly as though time is running out for the conciliatory approach. If Washington hardens its position, however, the problem may lie in convincing North Korea that this time the U.S. is serious.

Certainly, the deal struck on March 16 in New York appeared to fit a pattern of profitable brinksmanship by North Korea going back to the 1994 Agreed Framework. Under that deal, the U.S., Japan and South Korea pledged billions of dollars to build and fuel two nuclear-power plants for the North. In return, the North shut down a nuclear reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, about 160 kilometres north of Pyongyang, that was capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.

This time, the perceived North Korean threat is a massive underground facility at Kumchangri, 16 kilometres from Yongbyon, where the U.S. suspects North Korea is secretly pressing ahead with its nuclear-weapons programme. Intelligence reports cite evidence of underground cooling pools that are characteristic of a "nuclear processing plutonium breeder reactor."

After several difficult rounds of talks, North Korea agreed to open the facility to a U.S. team in May 1999, May 2000 and thereafter for as long as the U.S. has suspicions about the site. At the same time, the U.S. pledged to launch an agricultural project in the famine-hit North that would include 100,000 tonnes of food aid.

The State Department says the inspections and the food aid are separate matters, and there was no quid pro quo. However, within days of the March 16 accord, Radio Pyongyang reported that the U.S. had agreed to pay a "fee" for visiting the underground facility.

Criticism from the Republican-controlled Congress was swift. "This agreement smacks of a 'food for access' deal which could lead to further provocative actions on the part of the North Koreans to extort future concessions from the U.S.," says Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the House of Representatives' international-relations committee. "It looks like we are pouring good U.S. food aid down a North Korean hole."

Indeed, late last year the U.S. agreed to provide 500,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea under the auspices of the Rome-based World Food Programme. Politically, food aid is not a hard sell: It benefits American farmers who are facing depressed global demand due to the Asian and Russian economic crises.

Other aspects of the deal are controversial. While American officials say they will "inspect" the underground site, North Korean state radio said American inspectors will "visit" the site. A gulf exists between an inspection and a visit. Related to this, it remains unclear if the North has agreed to another key U.S. demand for permanently installing a monitoring device at the mouth of the underground tunnel leading into the site.

In Seoul, these potential problems have not stopped South Korean officials from expressing satisfaction with the March 16 agreement. "The negotiation has ended in a desirable direction," says Foreign Minister Hong Soon Young. President Kim Dae Jung is so pleased, in fact, that he is offering the North 50,000 tonnes of fertilizer--a reversal of his earlier statement that aid will depend on Pyongyang resuming peace talks with Seoul.

Kim's critics, however, hardly see the agreement as vindication of his "sunshine policy" of engaging the North. Even his coalition partner, the centre-right United Liberal Democrats, is reluctant to support the provision of any more food aid in the absence of direct talks. "This policy will only embolden the North to ask for more aid without a reciprocal move," says Lee Dog Book, a ULD spokesman on North-South issues.

In Washington, it's not clear how much longer Clinton can keep buying North Korean compliance while fending off congressional criticism. Unhappiness with Clinton's North Korea policy is deepening, both inside and outside Congress. "The latest agreement doesn't end questions of whether the North Koreans are continuing their nuclear programme," says Robert Manning, head of Asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, a New York-based think-tank.

Many in Congress believe that North Korea is simply moving its nuclear programme to different locations. "Following last summer's revelation of the underground facility, it is clear that the North Koreans have had the time to clear that facility of any suspected activities," Gilman said in a March 5 letter to Perry, who has been charged by Clinton with reviewing North Korea policy. Analysts believe that Pyongyang is biding its time with negotiations while developing a weapon of mass destruction to use as a bargaining chip.

An even darker analysis sees Pyongyang's possible nuclear programme as a longstanding plan for unifying the Korean peninsula on its own terms--through nuclear blackmail. "The North Korean missile programme allows the regime to develop a balance of terror in Northeast Asia that can be used to intimidate South Korea, Japan and the U.S.," says Peter Brookes, a Republican aide to the House international-relations committee.

Such sentiments resonate with Perry, who said at a Washington news conference on March 12 that the North Koreans "seem to have other programmes under way that are part of a nuclear effort."

Congressional sources close to Perry say he's concerned that Pyongyang may be developing a weapon of mass destruction by marrying the amount of enriched plutonium the regime had before the 1994 Agreed Framework--enough for around two or three bombs--to an intercontinental ballistic missile. Pyongyang's Taepo Dong 1 missile test over Japan last year appeared to have a third stage that would bring Tokyo and U.S. troops stationed in the Pacific under direct threat.

A new round of missile talks between the U.S. and North Korea, scheduled for March 29 in Pyongyang, also promise to be difficult and protracted. North Korea is asking for an annual "compensatory payment" of $1 billion in exchange for curbing its missile export programme. A February CIA report says North Korea is the world's largest supplier of ballistic missiles, equipment and technology to Iran, Syria, Egypt and Pakistan. Aside from counterfeiting, selling missiles is one of the few ways Pyongyang can earn much-needed foreign exchange.

Japan's demand to be included in the missile talks could produce further complications. Japan argues that it needs to be in a position to better monitor Pyongyang's missile threat since it's contributing $1 billion to the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization. Kedo is an international consortium financing the construction and fuelling of North Korea's "peaceful" nuclear plants under the Agreed Framework.

Whether or not the deal on Kumchangri is a quid pro quo, it's likely to be a prelude to changes in the U.S. approach to North Korea. Perry says he will give his policy recommendations to President Clinton in mid-April. As an architect of the Agreed Framework in Clinton's first administration, he will likely try to preserve the accord while presenting clearly defined carrots and sticks to show how the U.S. would react to both cooperative and provocative actions from Pyongyang.

Incentives could include normalization of relations with North Korea and the lifting of economic sanctions. Disincentives could include a possible U.S. troop increase on the Korean peninsula, a naval embargo on North Korea's suspected missile exports, and "red lines" that make clear that "provocative military action by North Korea will not be tolerated and will provoke a response." This approach was recommended in a policy paper submitted to the administration by a group of past national-security aides led by former Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Armitage.

An approach that has clear incentives--and, for once, clear disincentives--will likely satisfy Congress sufficiently for it to approve continued funding for Kedo. The money comes up for a vote in June. With U.S. access to Kumchangri secured and a fresh round of missile talks under way, the administration will probably win a mandate from Congress to proceed with the Agreed Framework's negotiations and a possible broader incentive package.

The wild card, of course, is how Pyongyang would receive a broader U.S. offer. Presumably, a normalization of relations and easing of sanctions, opening the floodgates for international aid, would ensure the survival of Kim Jong Il's regime. But the central question is how wedded the Korean People's Army is to developing a weapon of mass destruction, and how willing it is to negotiate such an option away. That remains unanswered by the Kumchangri deal.

Up to now, every time Pyongyang has threatened to derail the Agreed Framework, Washington has responded with further concessions. "The most difficult thing is going to be to persuade them that you are serious this time," says Manning of the Council on Foreign Relations. "Clinton does have a credibility problem."

Viewed from the North Korean perspective, simply by agreeing to open Kumchangri to U.S. visits, North Korea has ended up collecting as much as 600,000 tonnes of food aid and 50,000 tonnes of fertilizer, with a promise of more to come. If the Agreed Framework continues to buy time while bearing fruit for North Korea, filibustering may continue to be its most worthwhile option.