by Brent ChoiThe Hostage Situation: Is It For Real?
Yes, it's like watching a movie. North Korea is the villain at the railway site, holding an innocent captive while flashing something that looks like a dynamite. This bad guy threatens to blow up the place unless somebody pays him $1 million. The United States, South Korea, China and Japan who are taking the roles of FBI are wrecking their brains. Right now they're not even sure if the so-called dynamite this guy is holding is real. There are two ugly possibilities; the FBI group could just ignore the North's warning and proceed with the arrest only to find out the dynamite is real the hard way, or they could take the North's words at face value, pay the guy with the handsome sum at the risk of being tricked. If the villain did fool them that'll cost those agents not just their money but their jobs as well. What to do now?
A word of advice - don't get too hung up on the "dynamite" (nuclear program). After all it's likely the North is bluffing this time as well. The current situation is a lot similar to back in 1993-94 when Pyeongyang left Seoul and Washington greatly concerned over the same issue. That's how the Geneva Agreed Framework came to be in October 1994 as Washington agreed to build twin light water reactors worth $4 billion to the North. South Korea and Japan had to make some painful "contribution" for that decision. The North however just took the money and went back on its words to come clean. Imagine how those American scientists felt when they visited the suspected nuclear site of Yongbyeon later on only to find out a crane which they thought to be loading a fuel rod over nuclear reactor lying there broken.
Once more, the North is trying the same trick with its spent fuel rods and it seems Seoul, Washington and Tokyo are falling for it again. But there is still a good chance the North is still hindered by their backward technology or other complicated reasons. Furthermore if the actual reprocessing of fuel rods is taking place, why have we not heard of any reports on unique radioactive particles that should've affected Yongbyeon area so far? It is just like what is reported earlier by the Washington Post. The North is incapable of reprocessing due to technological reasons. Another source in Washington too tipped me off about the North's failure to reprocess their materials.
Let's return back to the villain with dynamite. If we actually go with the villain's request the guy would continue with the excuses to squeeze more money without ever letting the dynamite go. The same with the North whose best strategic card it holds against Washington is ambiguity. One will have to be a fool to let go off that lucky card. If we let that dynamite overrule our worries it'll only heighten the North's price for solution. We know what we want from this criminal; to let go of the captives, give up on dynamite threat and back off from the railway. That is, after inducing the criminal with appropriate reward. That leaves us just one particular solution. The bad guy is standing in the railway so use the train. First we instruct the engineer to drive the train slowly, about 3-kilometers per hour. Second, we instruct the good driver automate the train operation before he abandons it. The train will be on its own with no other control. The villain will be caught in a new dilemma. He knows that within half an hour he'll be clobbered by the train with no one else to turn to. He could either jump away from the track to save himself or blow up the whole place to be done with the miserable world. The success of this scheme will lie heavily on the speed of the train. If the train speeds a bit too fast, the criminal could end up blowing everything up out of confusion to think straight. It's better to slow down the vehicle to give the scoundrel some time to determine which is for the best, thus making the situation much more predictable.
No doubt Washington is still debating over what to make of the latest results of the three way talks in Beijing. It's doesn't take much to guess what hawks or neo-cons centered on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is voicing out. It's likely they view the North's admission of nuclear weapons as a direct challenge to the U.S. nonproliferation efforts and call for even tougher measures to isolate the dictatorial regime, strangle the economy even further and flex some muscle on that territory for change. The doves, largely represented by Secretary of the State Colin Powell, would probably be in the middle of playing down the North's threats, asking the officials not to be swayed by same old rhetoric and urging for additional negotiation following the recent talks.
We need both carrots and sticks to resolve the North's nuclear problem. Carrots without sticks would end up as another appeasement policy while sticks without carrots would result into unnecessary loss of lives. A right combination of such cold and hot measures would suit better to the situation then any other multilateral measures pursued by the Bush administration. So far we have all the major participants to the regional issue - Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo - opposed to the North going nuclear and such carrot-stick policy will help the Bush administration gain even better support from those members. On the other hand, radical measures like imposing embargo on the waterways will not serve its purpose too well. It takes both negotiations with the North and economic sanctions to untangle the mess.
In other words, what is most required at this time of need is a two-fold strategy that involves both the three-way main talks and Security Council meeting. Pyeongyang recently went through some tough times trying to realize the recent three-way talks with the U.S. and China, having sent its number two man Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok to Beijing and others. For now, it is better for Washington to resume the talks with the North to further tap on the North's given conditions. Just don't forget to prepare "the train" of economic sanction at the distance in case. Also, Washington don't have to accept North Korean proposal per se. According to S.Korean's experience North Korean's negotiation tactic is very similar that of Nam-Dae-Moon marke (largest traditional bazaar in Seoul). There is no fixed price in N.Korean shop. You can discount it.
Washington, in addition should take note of the mounting pressure the Stalinist regime is facing at home, its first kind coming from the ruling class left to deal with nation's nuclear gamble and the other from the low class commoners suffering under tattered economy. Perhaps the world's most isolated regime is going through similar internal debates as well; Old guards versus young elites over whether to give up the nuclear program or not for the survival of the regime. Washington may want to show off the case in Iraq to give additional push on that debate but it must be cautious. There's still a chance the Northern communists read it all wrong and say "So that's what happens when you're not armed with nuclear" instead. Meanwhile outside the capital city people's frustration is slowly reaching to the boiling point. With no food and electricity for past 10-years, the low class majority believe they've had enough and can't wait for some kind of radical change come hell or high water. Since the nation attributed all the sufferings to economic embargo imposed by the United States, this largely translates into war. One South Korean journalist who visited Pyeongyang this February asked one of the bus drivers how he feels about the possibility of war with the United States. "I wish they just get on with the war already," replied the haggard looking man.
Brent Choi is a N.Korea specialist in the Joong-ang Daily, Seoul, Korea