Opportunities and Challenges
By Robert A. Scalapino
Korea Times
April 26, 2000

The decision of the DPRK to accept President Kim Dae-jung's proposal of a summit meeting between the two Korean leaders came as a surprise to many observers. Up to date, the North has preferred to confine its relations with the South to unofficial exchanges, with an emphasis upon economic and cultural interaction. Political efforts have been directed primarily at achieving recognition from such key nations as the United States and Japan, and more recently, with a wide range of European and Asia-Pacific countries.

Why did Pyongyang leaders accept the summit proposal? Outside observers can only speculate on possible reasons. Perhaps the hope is that with official contacts, ROK financial aid and investment can be accelerated, the impasse in relations with the United States ended, and recognition from other nations, including Japan, given support. Perhaps the North feels more capable of entering into negotiations with the South at this point, given some alleviation of its past economic crisis and certain gains in international recognition.

Perhaps North Korean leader Kim Jong-il now feels sufficiently confident in his power to fulfill the legacy of his father whose pledge of a summit remained unrealized due to his untimely death. Perhaps it is hoped that this action will demonstrate before the citizens of both North and South the commitment of the DPRK government to reunification, thereby enhancing its image.

Whatever the reasons, one must be cautious at this point in seeking to discern the future course of South-North relations. While the summit pledge appears to be firm, on numerous occasions in the past, unexpected events have occurred, altering the previously projected course of relations between the two Koreas.

Assuming, however, that the summit materializes, what preparations should be made and what issues given priority so as to insure the most positive results? With respect to the South, it is important that the government of President Kim Dae-jung has maximum strength, hence, credibility. The immediate task therefore is to create a coalition that is stable and capable of continuing the reform program domestically and retaining the broad international support now existing. If the ROK continues to demonstrate economic strength, political stability and cooperative relations with all major powers, it will be able to negotiate with the DPRK with maximum effectiveness.

Meanwhile, it is crucial for the North to avoid actions, military or otherwise, that are provocative and create heightened tension. Issues such as sea boundaries should not be tested in the pre-summit period, and incursions of various types avoided. It would also be helpful if the type of inflammatory language toward the South often used in the past could be softened. Over time, the urgent need will be to create a climate of trust between the two Koreas, and that can only be achieved, step by step, as actions and words on both sides are conducive to more amicable relations.

Once the summit is realized, it will be important to emphasize in the initial negotiations those issues that are most susceptible to resolution. For example, visits by members of divided families; expanded communication rights, both private and media; and regularized dialogue, official and non-official through NGOs. It may also be possible to get DPRK agreement to attend certain multilateral dialogues currently in operation such as the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD). It should be made clear at all times that the ROK strongly approves of DPRK efforts to become more involved in regional and international affairs. Various forms of economic interaction should also be discussed.

Naturally, more complex issues should be placed on the table, with support given to a return to the idea of standing North-South sub-committees, each with its own agenda. Foremost in importance is the need for a peace treaty acceptable to all parties who were participants in the Korea War, followed by progress on tension reduction on the DMZ, and progressive arms reductions as well as creation of a wider and genuine disarmament zone. These developments, it should be noted, are to the advantage of both Koreas, but especially the North. At present, it is falling behind the South with respect to modernized armament despite its superiority in numbers. Defense funds are vastly less than those available to Seoul. Further, it has no certainty of external support in the event of conflict, even from China, whereas the ROK has a credible ally in the United States.

Nonetheless, the political-security issues confronting the two Koreas are formidable, and expectations for a complete or early resolution should be avoided. Past demands of the North such as a full repeal of the National Security Act or the removal of American forces from the South are unrealistic in the present climate. Similarly, the call in some ROK quarters for more extensive political openness in the DPRK is at least premature. It should be noted that the North's central reservation about the Sunshine Policy has been that it represents a subtle effort to undermine its political system. Acceptance of political difference at present represents the only sophisticated course.

What possibilities exist for the longer term? As is well known, various proposals for a confederated structure have been made. Most are variations of a one-country, two-systems model whereby some jointly operated institutions would be established to handle such issues as economic relations, while the political systems would remain separate, but with permanent liaison bodies to resolve or contain problems. All of these proposals are unrealistic for the immediate future. The first task is for the North to become a more integral part of its region and world, willing to accept an ever greater variety of interaction_economic, cultural and political-strategic. On such issues as environment, resources, and terrorism and then with respect to the more complex matters such as globalization and military modernization, the DPRK must join the modern world.

Meanwhile, the ROK also must evolve with the times. Democracy in the South has scored remarkable gains in the past several decades. Yet clearly, certain problems, some of which it shares with other democracies, must be remedied: deeply rooted regionalism, making concentration on issues difficult; personal authoritarianism juxtaposed against democratic institutions; excessive bitterness in political debate; and corruption in officialdom. Further, in the economic realm, excessive nationalism must not be allowed to block essential reforms.

As these problems are tackled and as a new economic order continues to emerge, the ROK can be a model to others, and while the North-South systems will continue to be significantly different, barring DPRK collapse or conflict (both unlikely), the capacity to communicate and work together effectively will be enhanced. In this process, moreover, the major powers have an important role to play. By their individual and collective actions, they should encourage current trends, rendering support to the North's new policies and the South's reform efforts while maintaining the position that South-North relations are fundamentally to be resolved by the two parties directly concerned.

The writer, well-versed in Northeast Asian affairs is a professor emeritus at University of California, Berkeley.

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