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Roots of Anti-Americanism
[Commentary]
Korea Herald
by Lee Kyong-hee
August 7, 2000
By remarking about the unfairness of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States and criticizing Washington for being slow to resume negotiations on an amendment, President Kim Dae-jung distinguishes himself from most Korean politicians, who often remain silent about delicate diplomatic issues involving major powers.
Kim's remarks were a shot in the arm for civil society, which had been calling for an all-out revision of the controversial treaty that determines the legal status of American troops stationed in Korea. Civic groups, which thought neither the Korean nor U.S. governments were hearing their pleas, came to realize that somebody at the top was actually listening - and willing to voice their concerns.
Then, last week, on the cusp of the long-awaited SOFA talks in Seoul, President Kim expressed concerns about anti-Americanism among Koreans. He said anti-Americanism did not benefit the nation.
"We can criticize if the United States makes a policy which we feel is wrong, but this should not lead to anti-Americanism," he said. "The presence of U.S. forces serves our national interests."
No doubt the President was right in emphasizing the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance and the U.S. military presence here. He is not wrong to warn that, ultimately, anti-Americanism in not in Korea's best interests. Unfortunately, though, Kim never told the other side of the story.
It is obvious that, like most intimate human relations, the relationship between Korea and the United States has been one of love and hate. There is no denying that Uncle Sam has been "the greatest supporter" of Korea over the years. Nevertheless, without recognizing the mutuality of needs, neither party can expect to reap the maximum future benefit from the alliance.
For anyone interested in learning from the past, Korea's modern history - over the last century or so - can be inspiring.
Apparently, it was not by chance that, after a couple of unsuccessful military attempts to open the doors of the "hermit kingdom" of Choson, the United States became the first Western nation to sign a treaty with Korea, in 1882. This was six years after Korea signed its first modern treaty with Japan on the island of Kanghwa. King Kojong wished the "Corean-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce" would undercut Japan's monopolistic position in Korean trade and at the same time provide a counterweight to Russian pressures.
But the growing ambitions of Japan and Russia concerning Korea and Manchuria evolved into war. Japan launched a successful surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in 1904. It was the so-called "Taft-Katsura agreement" of 1905 that gave Japan a "free hand" in Korea and paved the way for colonization of the peninsula.
It should be noted that diplomatic notes exchanged between U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese in a conference in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, acknowledged a trade-off between the Philippines and Korea. Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for brokering this "peace treaty," which gained unanimous support from most Western imperialist powers.
History repeats itself in an intriguing way. In August 1945, toward the end of World War II, in a meeting of the U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, it was decided that the Korean Peninsula would be divided into two occupational zones - and hoped that the Soviets would agree. Dean Rusk, a major at the time, and Col. Charles H. Bonesteel, later a commander of the American forces in South Korea, were given just 30 minutes to select an appropriate line. (Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, Norton, 1997) They chose the 38th parallel and the Soviets readily agreed. It was not surprising, considering that, coincidence or not, Russians had proposed back in 1904 that the territory of the peninsula north of the 39th parallel be declared "a neutral zone" where neither Russia nor Japan would be allowed to bring troops.
In 1980, many Koreans came to suspect the role the United States played - or failed to play - in the bloody suppression of the democratic uprising in Kwangju. There have been various accusations of U.S. complicity in the massacre, but one common contention among Koreans is that the United States was in a position to prevent Chun Doo Hwan and his minions from deploying the lethal Special Forces in the city. This claim is based on the coordination arrangement between the ROK and the U.S. armed forces under the 1978 agreement for a "Combined Forces Command."
More than a few Koreans remain deeply critical of America's acquiescence to Chun's seizure of power and of the subsequent protestations by the United States that it should not be held responsible for the bloodshed in Kwangju.
They resent the United States because the ideals of democracy and legality scorned by Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae-woo are values long espoused by the United States on the international stage. (James West, Martial Lawlessness The Legal Aftermath of Kwangju, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, University of Washington, 1997) Most of the anti-American demonstrations in Korea these days seem to have their ideological roots in the much more militant student demonstrations from the early 1980s. They are reminiscent of the radical leftist movements that followed the breakdown of the Cold War regime. As President Kim noted, some tend to take advantage of the recent thaw in inter-Korean relations to challenge the presence of U.S. troops.
What the authorities in both Seoul and Washington should bear in mind at this volatile juncture is that they must try to look into the real causes of anti-American demonstrations. They must review whether they have provided unnecessary ammunition for public outrage by failing to respond sincerely and promptly to reasonable complaints.
It would be useless to try to quell the protests without endeavoring to resolve the issues raised. In this regard, the United States had better be more candid in admitting that its military presence here is intended to promote the mutual benefit of the two countries. Any attempt to redefine their partnership for a better future needs to be based on this recognition.
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