SOFA Discussion
"In Focus" weekly news interview
Arirang Television (Seoul)
May 2003Hello, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to In Focus.
Since December last year, Anti-American sentiment in South Korea has risen to a dangerous point, triggered by an accident in which two Korean teen-age girls were killed by a U.S. armored vehicle during a military exercise. Candle-light vigils, protesting the acquittals of the two U.S. soldiers, continue to this day. According to a major newspaper survey, more than 90% polled in South Korea called the Status of Forces Agreement unfair and demanded that it be revised. This agreement, better known as SOFA, governs the legal status of the 37,000 American troops here. What are the true facts behind SOFA? Should revisions be made? We'll take a closer look at the controversies surrounding the SOFA, against the backdrop of the 50th anniversary of the US-South Korea alliance, after these messages.
Welcome back.
We'll be discussing today this very important issue about SOFA, and how it might affect the broader US-Korea relations into the future, and to discuss this issue, We have two very important experts on this issue. Let me first turn to my right. We have Mr. Robert T. Mounts, who is Special Assistant for International Relations of the US SOFA Secretariat, and also the US Secretary to the SOFA Joint Committee. You've been here since 1989, and I believe that you've been involved mostly with the process of revision of SOFA all these times, so you're an expert on this issue.
Now let me turn to my left, Professor Nam Chang-hee, who is professor at the College of Social Sciences at Inha University. And you were, before joining the Inha University, for seven years, with the KIDA, the Korea Institute of Defense Analysis, mainly touching on issues covering US-South Korea alliance and obviously on the SOFA agreement as well. So, I look very much forward to our discussions on this issue. But before going into that, we have a newsreel film on SOFA and let's take a look at the news film first. Shall we?
(Narrator)
The Status of Forces Agreement, which governs the legal status of the 37,000 American troops here, was a major target of last year's anti-US sentiment. Activists raised the need to change what they called unequal provisions in the pact. The US-ROK SOFA, signed in 1966, was modeled after various pre-existing agreements, including the US-Japan SOFA and the US-Germany supplemental agreement to the NATO SOFA.
Criminal jurisdiction of most offenses is concurrent, meaning both Korea and the US can exercise jurisdiction. However, the Korean government has the primary right to exercise its criminal jurisdiction for most offenses against Korean law, except under two cases, official duty cases and offenses solely against SOFA personnel and property. Official duty cases are limited to offenses clearly arising during the course of conducting official military duties. The same rule applies in Japan and Germany. In 2001, the US further agreed to transfer custody to Korea upon indictment for felony-level crimes and to allow Korea to maintain custody on arrest when the individual is arrested on the scene of the crime or in flight therefrom.
Seoul is seeking improvements to the Status of Forces Agreement, to give criminal authorities a bigger role in criminal cases. Last December, Justice Ministry and Foreign Ministry officials, met with Staff Judge Advocate, Col. Kent Meyer and other US Forces Korea staff members in a forum called the Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee.
The Korean authorities wanted to have a guarantee to access to suspects in the initial stages of investigations, which received a positive response from the US team.
In the meantime, the USFK announced a kick-off of the Good Neighbor Program, in its effort to mitigate the growing anti-American sentiment. The Combined Forces Command will set up Korean language hot lines at its Headquarters and a Korean language Website as part of efforts to enhance mutual understanding.
Host: Well, there we have it. There is some sort of like a perception, maybe isolated ones, but as if SOFA is something that's very unique between the US and South Korea when it really, I mean, it's not just about the US and South Korea. The US has many SOFA agreements, and South Korea also has many SOFA agreements with other countries.
So, let me first turn to you, Mr. Mounts. Can you just take us through, for the general audience as to what exactly is SOFA and what does it mean for Korea and Korean-American relations, and what are some of the, some key features and functions of SOFA?
Mr. Mounts: Well, the first thing I would say is that the SOFA is a basic stationing agreement, which, in this case, supplements the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, under which the US Forces are permitted the right to remain in Korea as a visiting force, not as an occupying force. You know, during wartime situations, such as the Korean War, we had a different type of agreement, called the Daejeon Agreement, in which related nations that comes with armed forces brings its flag with it, we called it the law of the flag. And when you transition to relative peace, to armistice conditions, and you plan for the on-going deployment of troops over a long period of time, then you enter into a bilateral international agreement governing the status of those forces, and that's what the SOFA does.
Host: And Professor Nam, what about the US-South Korea SOFA? I mean, it's been there for quite some time and that has undergone a number of revisions, most recent one, of course in 2001. Can you sort of take us through the genealogy of the SOFA agreement between the US and South Korea and if you give the current address as to where exactly it stands?
Prof. Nam: Yes. Here, I understand my role is not to argue with Mr. Mounts on legal aspects of SOFA. But I came here as a person who has done extensive research on what the civic groups demand on SOFA. So, I am saying this because I'm not a lawyer and I'm not so familiar with the legal concepts, but briefly introducing what has been revised in SOFA.
There have been two revisions. In 1991, which was ratified in 1992, and the second one is what you have mentioned, in 2001, then substantial development, enhancement in problematic parts in the SOFA. And the US side has done their part to improve the problematic parts of the SOFA. And, but still, the civic groups have a lot of more complaints, with which they want to change the current SOFA agreement.
Host: And of course, particularly since last December, the US-South Korea Alliance has been under a lot of strain, because of the trials of the two US soldiers who were involved in this really regrettable and terrible accident which led to the death of the two young girls. And this called for the public or some civic organizations to call for the SOFA revision and that somehow the accident could have been prevented should the SOFA have been otherwise, as if SOFA was to be blamed for what has happened. How do you respond to sort of accusations, and finger pointing, if you will, or scapegoating of SOFA as being somehow responsible for the accident that has happened?
Mr. Mounts: First, let me say this. I'm a father with two teen-age daughters of my own and I can only imagine the terrible pain and suffering that the parents of the two teen-age girls have undergone. No one intended for this accident to occur and it was a very, very tragic scene and I can only imagine how I would feel if it was my daughters. So it is a case that all of us take very seriously. And there are many things, though, many positive things that the US tried to do to make amends for the accident, most of which has not been reported. And I might ask you, for example, do you know who first organized the candle-light vigil as a memorial for these two girls?
Prof. Nam: I'm not sure, but I know that a young man, a Korean young man started it, I mean initiated it by proposing that we have, Koreans have a candle-lit vigil.
Host: On the Internet.
Prof. Nam: On the Internet, yes.
Mr. Mounts: In fact, the Second Infantry Division, the Chaplain Corps., organized a vespers-like service, in which they held a candle-light vigil, and invited the family members, although they declined to attend, and over six hundred soldiers and their families attended, not as a political statement, but as a sincere expression of their grief over what had occurred. After all, they all know, all knew, this was a terrible, terrible event. In addition, what's not known, is that the driver of the vehicle; he himself is a father with three children. He's thirty-six years old, with three children of his own in the States, while he was here performing military training. You could only imagine how he must have felt, because in the position he was sitting, he couldn't actually see the two girls, until impact. I know that the very day it occurred, he and the Commander, 2nd Infantry Division visited both families to express their sorrow, and since then, that very day also, the Commander of the 8th US Army, General Zaninni, made a public apology, and we have tried since then to do everything possible to prevent future accidents like that and also to see that the right thing was done, that justice was done.
But the problem is that there is a difference between holding someone criminally culpable, such as you put him in jail for a crime and taking responsibility in a civil way. There is a way to compensate victims of an accident like this, through the claims process, and that was done. Both families accepted monetary compensation of almost 200 million Won, for each child, that was in September, and even before the trials took place.
There were three separate investigations. There was a safety investigation, there was a military accident investigation and there was a joint criminal investigation, in which all the information was shared to the broadest extent possible, both with the Uijongbu Prosecutors, and with the Korean National Police. As a result of the safety and criminal investigations though, I can tell you, as a lawyer, I looked at that and I saw that no one person, no one single factor was a direct, immediate cause of the accident. It was a combination or a chain of events that resulted in the accident.
Nevertheless, as you know, using the rules for jurisdiction, under the SOFA, using one of the two narrow categories where the US actually has the primary right to exercise jurisdiction, in an official duty case, the US attempted to bring two people to justice for the criminal offense of negligent homicide. But those cases are very difficult to prove. We had our own case in 1994 in the Iraq No-Fly Zone, where a US pilot by mistake, shot down two US helicopters with 28 US personnel and all perished. He was also court-martialed for negligent homicide and was found not guilty. So it is very difficult to prove criminal responsibility. But the Command accepted responsibility. General LaPorte accepted responsibility for the accident. And we have done everything we can since to ensure that it doesn't happen again.
Host: And of course, there has been a series of apologies which have been made by the US Embassy and the US President himself. But still, I think what is important is to deal with the perception and it seems like all the proper, right steps were taken in light of what has happened. And yet, a good number of Korean civic organizations supported by the public, seem dissatisfied and there seems to be a question mark as to, as to, to the fact that maybe, maybe, the trial itself was not fair, that somehow, an unfair law is being applied there, and really, at the end of the day, those who are responsible are getting away with it. And why is there, why are some of the things what Mr. Mounts has just elaborated has not been communicated, to the point where some of those people who are raising the question are dissatisfied? And what exactly is it that these people are raising?
Prof. Nam: Yes. In 1998 and in 1997, too, I conducted an extensive research through a field study to various USFK bases and facilities, and tried to meet the most, most important leaders of civic groups. And I can tell you that I know most of the leaders of today's pan-Korea civic groups. And from the in-depth communications, interviews that I conducted, what I sense is that there are two different kinds of civic groups. The first one is somehow ideologically motivated civic groups. The other groups are purely those victims who have suffered some problems in the stationing of the USFK. What I found is a need to divide the two groups. And I just suggested my government some measures, which was not responded, I believe. And I think these two different groups have now merged to one. And, even though SOFA has, as I told you in the beginning, has undergone substantive development and enhancement, and still the ideologically motivated civic groups is leading the group. And now in the group, the pure victims with it, the number of those groups has grown. So I saw some fundamental political agenda behind those slogans. I myself might believe that the US-ROK SOFA is not 100% fair. But I should say, it's like, 99 percent fair. So it' not unfair, but we can do something more about it to improve the implementation part of it. But in general, I think our SOFA with the US is almost the same with what Japan and Germany has, have with the United States. So what we need to do is to improve our implementation of it and the second thing to do is to divide the two different kinds of groups by proactively engaging those pure victims and by doing so, it can enhance our bilateral relationships.
Mr. Mounts: The real issue the NGOs are concerned about, in the context of the highway 56 case, is the concept of official duty. You know, what offenses are legitimately arising in the course of official duty. And what they would like is to have that decision made by the Korean side, rather than the military command. The basics though, you know, of jurisdiction is very simple to explain. Almost every offense is concurrent jurisdiction, meaning either Korea or the US can investigate and prosecute those offenses. And within that we have the rules that go back to 1966, that determines who has the primary right. The US has the primary right only in two narrow categories of cases. One is where we are the victim, or one of our people is a victim and the other is of course when it arises in official duty.
The highway 56 case of June 13th is a classic official duty case, because it occurred in the midst of military training, during an exercise, convoy going down the road, drivers on the line with superiors, they were getting instructions, they were focused totally on their job. They never intended this terrible, terrible accident to occur. And there is nothing that can take it out of the official duty case, such as fleeing the scene of the accident, drunken driving or some intentional misconduct. So everyone understood, including the Ministry of Justice, that this was an official duty case, within the primary right of the US. But believe or not all the other types of offenses under the Korean law are within the Korean government's primary right. And that constitutes 80% of all, so-called GI crimes. So, then, there is the question of unfairness. You know, unfairness, fair or unfair, is a subjective evaluation. How do you judge whether something is fair or unfair? One way is to look at other similar agreements, like the one with Japan, or the one with Germany. Another way is to look at agreements the Republic of Korea government has with other countries, for example, the one that was just signed in January with the Kyrgyz Republic. Another way is to look at the agreement itself, and see if there is a basic, even-handed trade-off, with the underlying interests of both parties addressed. That's an objective methodology for evaluating the SOFA -- much better than the emotional reaction that ‘We hate this event, we don't like what happened and we want it changed!' That's an emotional reaction.
In that sense, the official duty rule, when you look at other SOFAs, is the same world-wide. We have about 105 SOFAs, the major ones being of Korea, Japan and Germany. It's the same in Japan. Same exactly. And in fact in 1991, during the first revision, Korea was given greater participation in the decision than any other ally. They can now question or object to an official duty determination at several levels of consultation, up through and including the Joint Committee and diplomatic channels. We also require that it be made by not just by any commander but by a general officer with the advice of his judge advocate. That's not required in Japan, or in other countries. Believe it or not, this process was waived in the Highway 56 case. It was only after public outcry began to build that the Ministry of Justice decided to request a waiver of jurisdiction, knowing that it would be unprecedented, and it would be extremely difficult for the US to agree. Then, you look at the Korea's SOFA with the Kyrgyz Republic, that gives the Republic of Korea exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses, not just official duty cases and that's …(interrupted by the host)
Maybe that's appropriate in a new relationship. You really don't know how your are going to adjust to the local judicial system and the local law.
Host: So, basically, if you were to draw a conclusion, that when compared to other SOFA agreements that the US has with some of the key allies, particularly that of Japan and Germany, you're suggesting that it's not only equal, but in fact in some parts, the one that you have with South Korea is even better in a way. And I think that's, that's an important point that you are raising. Because I think a lot of the issues that's coming out of the civic organizations raising unfairness and unevenness of the SOFA agreement that we have with the US points to the US agreement with Japan, as if that's somehow better or more privileges provided for the host nations of Japan or Germany.
Mr. Mounts: In 1991, the Korean side also wanted judicial review in the Korean court of the official duty decision. But in a two party relationship, we could not find a neutral tiebreaker, you know, a judge who is absolutely neutral in deciding a case. So a fallback was to give them greater participation in the decision. Because it's uniquely a Commander's decision -- a military commander has to determine, whether or not his soldier, sailor, airman or marine is actually performing their military duties at the time of the offense.
Host: Is the jurisdiction a key to the civic organization(s) that's calling for a revision, quote and unquote, revision of SOFA agreement?
Prof. Nam: Well, not only this issue, there are several other issues -- provisions on areas and facilities, environmental issues, and claims service and labor part of the SOFA. The civic groups have very talented lawyers as advisors. They had an extensive study on the SOFA and they have their own version of a revised SOFA. I reviewed the parts, and another important part of it is the environmental part, environmental issues. The issues have, have recently provoked some criticism about the oil leakage in Yongsan Garrison, I guess. So, what are the efforts of the USFK in order to deal with, effectively deal with the pollution issues?
Mr. Mounts: I'm happy to talk about that because that was probably the second most important issue in the recent revisions. And as a result, we now have the first ever, environmental clause in any SOFA world-wide. Now, it's mutual, meaning both governments have undertaken to conduct military operations with a view towards protecting the environment. It's aspirational, meaning these are goals that we want to do with funds when they become available. And in that sense, it's been criticized because some say, ‘Oh, it's just declaratory,' meaning it's not binding.' But in actual practice, and in the implementation of that, we have signed other agreements, approved by the Joint Committee, which are binding. The key one is, how we manage and how we respond to any new environmental accident that may occur. And you have to realize that in large industrial operations, like a military force with 93 camps, stations and bases, aging facilities much of which date back even before the Korean War, some of which were inherited from the Japanese times, that there are going to be problems. The key is how we respond to it, when we find something that needs to be cleaned up. How do we report that, how do we work together to manage the issues, and do what's necessary to protect the public? And we have an agreement in place to do just that. We have exchanged points of contact, all the way from the local to the national level, when there is a new incident reported, we work together, to ensure access to the site, to ensure that there is transparency, and that Korean authorities, responsible members of the government, Ministry of Environment, local environmental authorities, can come and see exactly what is being done, and if they desire, take tests, you know, do their own survey, and to assist us in the work that needs to be done in order to fix the problem.
Many of the problems are caused by the fact that we have many, many underground storage tanks where petroleum products have been stored, some of which even we don't know about. And we find about it when there was, there was a new foundation excavated to build a new construction, or like happened a couple of years ago in the Osan base -- a nineteen inch rain storm which popped up the storage tanks out of the ground and broke the line. You know, it was an act of God. But in that event, the Commander invited the mayor of Pyongtaek, and the city authorities out to show exactly what measures were being taken to clean them up. And we had a successful ending.
Host: And you er-- pointed out about the new environmental clause, which was incorporated into the revision that was made in the year 2001, and that's the only clause, environmental clause that the US has with other countries amongst all the 105 SOFA agreements?
Mr. Mounts: That's correct.
Host: And this could serve as a sort of like a model for other possible environmental clauses that other countries sign with you in the future revisions?
Mr. Mounts: In part, we took note of the fact that in Japan, through the Defense Ministers, they signed a statement of principles for cooperation in the similar areas with respect to the environment and we adopted that as part of a Special Non-binding Memorandum of Understandings and we have agreed to develop our Environmental Governing Standards, looking at requirements of the ROK law, and picking whichever is more protective as our goal, and we agreed for access to our facilities, not as a big media event, not as an occasion for NGOs to make political statement, but in a sincere effort to fix the problems that are identified.
Host: And Professor Nam, you already mentioned, as you were getting the list of some of the things that the civic groups are raising including the environmental issue, the pre-trial custody, jurisdiction and you've also mentioned about land. What is it exactly that is being raised with regards to the land that the US Forces Korea occupies here in Korea?
Prof. Nam: Yes, about the land parts. I found in the reading, and this is what I actually found from my extensive interviews with those farmers and landowners whose land was, according to them, was deprived by the government and was granted to the USFK, for nothing.
Host: No compensation?
Prof. Nam: No compensation. And this was clear as a critical difference. In Japan, well I made a research trip to Japan more than six times and in Japan, the Japanese government has compensated virtually all of the land which is owned by private citizens. But in Korea, we have a lot of land especially in the 2ID area where the private land was granted to USFK without any compensation. This is a problem that should be addressed by the Land Partnership Plan or a future realignment program.
Host: Now, is this something that has lasted, probably not recently, but probably mostly back in the 50's and 60's in which it has been just sitting, not being addressed, in many, many, I suppose in several decades?
Prof. Nam: Yes, that's right.
Host: And is it, is it what the civic organizations are raising, it's compensation, for the lands?
Prof. Nam: Compensation, plus, what they want to be revised or changed in the supplementary agreements in SOFA is that the landowners and at least leaders of the civic groups want to participate in SOFA granting process, SOFA land granting,
Host: SOFA land granting
Prof. Nam: Yes, SOFA land grating procedures. So they want to get to know whether our land will be granted or not. They want to at least get to know whether they can protect their property or not. So, on the compensation issue, I think this is not the issue of SOFA. It should be addressed by the Korean government. I think the Korean government has been negligent of the, the, this compensation issue, for, because of the lack of their financial assets.
Mr. Mounts: Let me explain here. Korea and Japan have basically the same provision in the SOFA for land use. The key one here is the cost of maintenance- how we share the burden, how we share the cost. The US has undertaken to provide all the costs for maintaining its forces. And that includes personnel salaries, equipment, supplies, all the things that are brought in. And we spend about 2.6 billion dollars a year just maintaining forces in Korea. The Korean defense contribution, under the SOFA, is to provide facilities and areas that we are granted, allowed to use without cost to the United States, and to compensate the private land owners for the use of their land.
The unfortunate thing is that immediately after the war, during the reconstruction years, there was not much money to do so. And many of the US forces stayed at the facilities they were using as battle positions after the war. And when the SOFA went into effect, much of the land was granted to the US forces without full compensation being paid. That's very unfortunate. In Japan, particularly in Okinawa, the Japanese government pays, you know, rent for renewable annual leases. It's their way of compensating for the land. The Korean government is now attempting, through the Land Partnership Program, we are going to fix much of this. We will return, first return much of the land used for training, north of Seoul, mostly in the 2 ID areas, in exchange for a guarantee of limited joint use on a time share basis of available ROK Army ranges. That will be more efficient use of scarce facilities. The Korean government has also said that it will still purchase the land, much of which will be retained. The US forces will be allowed to fence it, mark it, and it will be recorded on property records so that everyone understands that it is set aside for military use. That will go a long way to solving some of those problems.
Host: I think one of the issues that are being raised, of course, is that there is a blind call for revision of the SOFA. Obviously, it seems like things are being conducted in a sensible manner. Still, there seems to be a lot of emotion amongst the civic organization leadership and the public who support them and calling for outright revision to address some of the issues that they are raising. Revision takes years and we've just had it in 2001. And in the US position, that there has not been a formal request for revision. And technically speaking, it might be, of course, difficult at this juncture. So, what are some of the ways, in terms of implementation of what we have already, what's in store in light of the recent revision that can address all those issues that the poor revision people may be raising, maybe you can look quickly as we run out of time?
Mr. Mounts: In December, we established a Special Joint Task Force that includes officials at the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade as well as representatives from the USFK and the US Embassy. That task force has met eight times. We've looked at a variety of important issues. The first agreement was to ensure mutual cooperation, close cooperation for investigations of the incidents of concurrent criminal jurisdiction, like Highway 56. And that's working very well, according to the Ministry of Justice. The second thing we've looked at was all the measures that have been taken and should be taken to prevent future accidents like the one that occurred on June 13th of last year. All that requires close cooperation with the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, Ministry of National Defense, and the ROK Army because all this involves access to training areas on narrow country roads, and installation of safety signs, warnings, and maybe widening of the roads to accomodate some of the heavy vehicles we must have for training.
Another issue we are looking at is all traffic-related issues, including parking tickets, compliance with ROK law, and of course USFK personnel should comply with the ROK traffic law. Insurance, there is a perception that USFK privately owned vehicles are not insured. But like any other Korean citizen, they are in fact all insured. You have to prove that every year when you re-register the vehicle. Cooperation with the sobriety test, on the roadsides, Breathalyzer tests, of course, you have to do these things. But with parking tickets, for example, a US person does not speak Korean, he needs to have it delivered properly, needs to have an English translation and they need to know how to settle the matter, you know, what to pay and where to go, just like any Korean citizen would need. Today, with data automation and computer services, we can improve that. We are going to share the information, we are going to make those changes. In addition, we've looked at two key issues that are central to the Land Partnership Plan. The environmental joint assessment on the lands to be returned, and for that matter, to be granted, we agreed on how to do that. We've also agreed on procedures for replacement facilities, and how they would be used to construct it, or build, in what we call In-kind Construction procedures. And there is a whole new variety of issues yet to come. This Joint Task Force has a life to last at least for one year, if not longer, and we are looking forward to making very positive improvements.
Host: So this is moving on a fast pace and in a positive direction. So, now, Professor Nam, you might want to sort of like, sum it up, looking at the SOFA situation, what is being done to improve upon it so that the sort of tensions might be settled in a sensible manner. How do you, where do you put this in a broader framework of the US-Korea alliance? What has it meant to the US-Korea relationship? And where is it taking us as far as the future alliance is concerned?
Prof. Nam: Yes. After the two revisions, what we need is to improve the implementation of it. I heard that negotiators have been working very hard to improve it, especially for the pre-trial custody issues, for example, some other insurance issues and compensation issues. So I think this is what can be done by the two governments, I mean, Korea's Foreign Ministry and the USFK. But to repeat, there's another dimension behind this problem that is the negligence of the real demands. It's not about SOFA. It's about compensation. It's about noise abatement issues. What the real victims want is not really like the SOFA. They want to have some better environment. And this is what can't be addressed by SOFA, but rather by budgeting issues. It's like, should be tackled by more input of financial assets to address those issues. But it needs money. So, it's my personal opinion, but we need to include this area, this compensation part for, into our cost-sharing agreements, possibly, you should, might not agree, but, and for our broader alliance relationships, if we continue (to) improvement of implementation, I think that SOFA wouldn't have that much problem. That's my personal view, but what problem, what the real problem is, I, to repeat, compensation issue and other demands raised by real victims.
Mr. Mounts: When claims are filed for damages, they're adjudicated first by a District Compensation Committee run by the Ministry of Justice. We review that, and when we pay the claim, the US pays 75%. So there is already a cost-sharing formula, to pay for that.
Prof. Nam: What I mean is, the noise abatement measures, in Japan, when I visited Japan, the Japanese government has spent a tremendous amount of money to build up anti-noise measures, for each household and around bases, the very, various different kinds of efforts to cool down, yeah, to compensate. Now, another part we need to do, is, to spend some money on the Korean part, and at the same time, (be) much more sensitive to the demands raised by real victims, of those maneuvers and trainings, and other exercises. So, by doing so, we can delineate the two different kinds groups and by doing so, I think we can effectively deal with all the alliance management issues.
Host: And on that note, I'm afraid we've run out of time, but I think we need a Round 2 to discuss further, on this very important issue. But I think it's been very constructive, in getting the facts straight, and in understanding where the SOFA agreement stands, and where some of the issues that have been raised by the civic organizations. And I think that we are all in agreement, as I hope the public will also, that things are being done, to address some of these issues, and done in a sensible and procedural way, that the, that assures us that the SOFA really is in good standing and that it is going to contribute to the broader understanding, and to improvement of the US-Korea alliance. So, on that note, I'd like to thank you both for joining us today, and hope to talk to you more on this issue at some later point. Thank you.
The strained alliance between South Korea and the United States is showing signs of improvement. The South Korean Foreign Ministry has established a new administrative unit to work exclusively on matters related to the US-South Korea Status of Forces Agreement, which will allow so to better coordinate it policies and activities. The US Forces Korea will soon be launching its Good Neighbor Program, aimed at narrowing the gap between the US soldiers and the Korean public. Hoping the new initiatives will restore the US-Korea alliance back to a healthy standing. This is Lee Jung-hoon, wrapping up for IN FOCUS.