Sunshine Policy Bearing Fruit
Reviewing President Kim's 2 Years
Feb. 16, 2000
By Moon Chung-in
The Korea Times

The advent of the Kim Dae-jung government and its sunshine policy has bred a new momentum for improved inter-Korean relations. President Kim, who was inaugurated in February 1998, marking the first peaceful transfer of political power in 50 years, made it clear from the outset that as long as North Korea does not resort to military provocation, he is willing to abandon the old policy of unification by absorption and to expedite cooperation and exchanges with the North. Kim's sunshine policy is not a tactical or instrumental move to maneuver domestic political support and legitimacy by making a short-term breakthrough to the stalled inter-Korean relations. It is strategic and consummate effort aimed at genuine, long-term improvements in inter-Korean relations through peaceful coexistence and mutual cooperation and exchanges. Kim's initiative underscores a major shift in South Korea's discourses on inter-Korean relations and national unification.

However, it seems too early to make any meaningful assessment of the sunshine policy because of the relatively short time since its implementation. But one thing is clear; it has not generated any major breakthroughs. President Kim's proposal of a summit talk with Kim Jong-il has so far been ignored by the North. The idea of exchanging special envoys for high-level political talks between the two has not been materialized either. Both Koreas have also failed to resume the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation, which is the cornerstone of the sunshine policy.

Moreover, the sunshine policy was greeted with the infiltration of North Korean spy submarines, the launch of a Taepodong I long-range missile, and most recently an intrusion into South Korea's West Sea as well as the detention of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang. Indeed, the politics of engagement and accommodation has not yet secured sizable trophies for the Kim government, and to the contrary, sporadic clashes and heightened hostilities between the two Koreas have undermined his initiatives.

Nevertheless, there are some promising signs of improved inter-Korean relations. Channels of dialogue which were broken during the Kim Young-sam government, are gradually being restored. With no concrete results notwithstanding, the vice ministerial-level talks on fertilizer aid to the North has reactivated government-to-government channels. And after a seven-year suspension, the Military Armistice Commission began to resume the General Officers Talks. Though slow and riddled with stalemates, the four-party talks are also making steady progress by the settling procedural differences and discussions being held on substantive issues. The Berlin settlement, partial lifting of economic sanctions and the overall reconciliatory tone of the Perry Report have brought North Korea and the United States closer, whereas Murayama's visit to Pyongyang in December 1999 led to the resumption of normalization talks between Japan and North Korea. All these developments have created an external milieu conducive to inter-Korean relations through the gradual dismantling of the Cold War structure.

The Hyundai Group's project of tourist development at Mt. Kumgang can be seen as the hallmark of the engagement policy. Since Hyundai Group signed the concession agreement with North Korea in November 1998, more than 150,000 South Koreans have visited Mt. Kumgang. Although South Korean tourists are not allowed to visit places other than Mt. Kumgang or to interact with North Koreans, it has made a significant contribution to confidence-building between the two Koreas and putting a positive spin on the effects of inter-Korean economic and social exchanges. An increasing frequency of exchanges of sports (soccer and basketball) and cultural events epitomizes the positive spinoff effects of the Mt. Kumgang project.

Apart from the Hyundai project, the engagement policy has also accelerated personnel exchanges. For eight years between 1989 to 1997, 2,408 South Koreans visited North Korea for economic, social, and personal reasons. And only 137 South Koreans were able to visit the North in 1997. But since the implementation of the sunshine policy, there has been a phenomenal growth in the number of visitors to the North. In less than two years between February, 1998 and November, 1999, 8,509 South Koreans visited the North for various reasons. Aside from this, the frequency of reuniting separated families has been on the rise. 289 separated families were able to reunite in China, and 838 separated families were able to verify the existence of relatives in the North as of November 30, 1999. In addition, while the South Korean government donated $39 million to North Korea during the period between March 1998 and November 1999, nongovernmental organizations in the South have dramatically increased humanitarian assistance to the North in the areas of famine relief, agricultural development and medical care, amounting to $38 million during the same period.

Economic exchanges and cooperation have been rather slow primarily due to the economic crisis starting in November, 1997. Inter-Korean trade in 1998 fell by 28 percent compared to the previous year, amounting to only $222 million. While exports to the North rose by 12.5 percent, imports from the North shrank by 52.2 percent. But in 1999, inter-Korean trade has been on the rise, reaching $300 million, owing partly to economic recovery in the South and partly to the pursuit of the sunshine policy. No sizable investments in the

North have existed before. The Kim government took several drastic measures to facilitate inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation including the expansion of the list of comprehensive approval items, deregulation of import permits and the upper ceiling on investment in the North, and adoption of the negative list system on joint ventures, economic exchanges and cooperation. The rapid South Korean economic recovery should also contribute to a rise in economic collaboration. Most remarkable is the expansion of South Korea's offshore production in the North. More than 130 South Korean firms are now producing a wide variety of items ranging from garments to color televisions in North Korea for export to third countries.

North Korea is also showing some visible signs of institutional and behavioral changes. The amended socialist constitution in 1998 has introduced market elements to its economic system by emphasizing the importance of cost, price and profit. At the same time, North Korea is allowing a gradual liberalization of domestic travel and farmer's markets, while stressing modernization of the agricultural sector. The most noticeable change is its willingness to learn the internal workings of the capitalist market economy. The North Korean government has sent more than 100 economic bureaucrats, managers of state enterprises and scholars to the outside world for capitalist market training. In cooperation with the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program, North Korea is planning to set up an economic management program in Pyongyang in order to train North Korean officials on the capitalist system. It is difficult to tell whether such training efforts are a product of the engagement policy, but the trend clearly suggests that North Korean society and economy are undergoing the gradual changes that the sunshine policy anticipates.

In view of the above, interim outcomes are mixed. While the engagement policy has not generated any major breakthrough at the official level, it has amplified exchanges and cooperation on the nongovernmental level. Despite the mixed outcomes, however, the sunshine policy has been able to garner extensive domestic and international support. The conservative circle still echoes skeptical and even dissenting views, but the general public in South Korea has favored the sunshine policy. According to a government poll conducted in June 1998 immediately after the infiltration of a North Korean spy submarine, 62 percent of respondents expressed the view that the engagement policy should continue regardless of the North Korean provocation. In a more recent poll taken after the naval clash in June 1999, 72.6 percent of respondents showed unfailing support for the policy. This can be attributed primarily to the Kim government's decisive military action, proving that it has not compromised security in the pursuit of engagement with the North.

In a similar vein, the sunshine policy has drawn considerable external support. While China and Russia have endorsed it without reservation, Japan is also backing Kim's initiative despite the launch of a Taepodong 1 missile and other unresolved issues with North Korea such as the return of kidnapped Japanese and the missile quagmire. As outlined in the Perry Report, the United States has adopted a policy of comprehensive engagement with North Korea, congruent with the sunshine policy. Likewise, the international community has extended a timely blessing to Kim's initiative.

Domestic support and external blessing do not necessarily guarantee its success, however. There are several challenges both at home and abroad that could undermine its thrust. While subtle bureaucratic resistance at home could delay implementation, domestic and international politics could cloud its future. Albeit some positive signs, North Korea's unpredictable behavior could deal a critical blow to the engagement and accommodation policy. The test launch of a second long-range missile or military provocation along the border will not only aggravate public opinion in the South, but also invite fierce opposition from the United States and Japan. Failure to achieve a major breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, mounting fatigue effects on the South Korean population, a ruling party defeat in the April 2000 general election with a subsequent legislative gridlock and a conservative counterattack could all produce enormous domestic political constraints.

Changes in the United States could also undermine the nature and direction of the sunshine policy. The election of a Republican candidate in the 2000 presidential race and a subsequent shift of American policy to a hard-line position could derail Kim's engagement policy. Persistent resistance by a Republican congress and the failure to deliver economic incentive packages to the North could again strain Pyongyang-Washington ties, leading to another protracted stalemate. Stalled negotiation over the nuclear liability insurance within the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the delayed implementation of the
Shinpo nuclear reactor project could emerge as another difficult hurdle to improved inter-Korean relations.

Likewise, the sunshine policy resembles a perilous odyssey. Despite all these challenges and obstacles, however, President Kim is not likely to abandon his policy since it constitutes one of the twin pillars of his governance. In a single-term presidency, abandonment or substantial amendment of the sunshine policy could precipitate a crisis of his governability.

It is also his belief and philosophy. More than anything else, that there is no other alternative. As William Taylor aptly states, ``Constructive engagement has to be the name of the game.'' It is the only viable way to ensure peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, while avoiding catastrophic consequences. Thus, Kim will stick to it no matter how precarious the internal and external milieu would become. It seems a worthy enterprise. It might not end with a futile one-sided love. North Korea will soon learn and appreciate its virtue and merits. Patience on the part of the people and wisdom and prudence on the part of the government will result in fruitful outcomes.

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The writer is professor of political science and director of the Institute for Korean Studies at Yonsei University.

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