Wild, Wild Speculation(?)
Tom Coyner
Dec. 9, 2004

(See related article from Yonhap following this, below.)

As we end this year and look forward to the next, one may ponder what kind of world we will be facing at the end of 2005. For North Korea watchers, this year’s stab at predicting the future is probably more interesting than any year for quite some time.

As an amateur analyst I do not pretend to be even remotely clairvoyant about anything as obscure as the Pyongyang oligarchy. However, like many others, I do have a hunch or two. What I am to spell out has been run by various professionals in the intelligence, journalism and business communities who individually and certainly collectively have much greater wisdom and experience than my own. I have essentially challenged them to find weaknesses in my suggested scenario for 2005. The strongest criticism I have received to date is that my speculation is simply too logical.

So what is this hunch? Simply that there will be a regime change sponsored and supported by China in 2005. Now if I were a gambler I would put my safe money on Kim Jong-il still being in power come 2006 -- but if I were a professional gambler I would hedge almost as much money that Kim will be out of power within 12 months.

In the past weeks I have joked that Hu and Bush made a handshake deal when they met in Santiago, Chile. Bush would take care of Iraq and possibly Iran while China would take the North Korean problem off of the US President’s desk. While I seriously doubt such an agreement has taken place, there may be something similar in the works, if only in a tacit sense.

North Korea with its growing nuclear capacity remains an open flaw in Washington’s overall foreign policy. While U.S. Forces are supposed to have the capacity to take on another military theater of engagement, they are already over-extended in Iraq, with no end in sight.

Officially China has never tolerated nuclear weapons on its borders, save in the Soviet Union/Russia. However in recent years it has discovered to its dismay a nuclear weapons contest across its Himalayan border between India and Pakistan. Perhaps even more alarming is North Korea, located a short distance from Beijing, not only developing its own atomic bombs but using them as a means of intimidation for foreign aid since Pyongyang effectively does not have the ideological capacity to engage in substantially meaningful trade like a normal country. Beijing may have more influence on Pyongyang than any other government, but its leverage remains frustratingly limited. While there is a fairly consistent logic in North Korea’s foreign policy, it is a desperate diplomacy that can quickly change direction in the interests of regime survival. Consequently North Korea can be viewed as an nuclear loose cannon at the backdoor of the PRC.

Furthermore, the DPRK’s threats to use nuclear weapons have already worked against Chinese interests. The prospect of Pyongyang ’s nuclear-equipped missiles has shaken pacifist Japan to its core, leading to a militarization of Tokyo’s foreign policy ranging from sending troops to Iraq to developing long-range missiles of its own. In addition to an increasingly remilitarized Japan, the US has become more vigilant toward new military theaters going active in NE Asia, given North Korea’s increasing ability to strike or at least intimidate. None of this, of course, is developing in China’s favor.

The Chinese leadership is working hard to upgrade its image as the 2008 Olympics draw near. While most are impressed by China’s economic gains, the increasing problem of North Korean refugees elicits continuing condemnations from the West of China’s handling of this desperate mass of people. Despite countermeasures, the problem continues to grow and could easily erupt in a very nasty way just prior or during the upcoming Olympics. Until the root cause of this outflow of Koreans is resolved, China will be pressed to take increasingly drastic measures that are likely to provoke even more overseas censure.

Given the current situation, it may be possible for a senior North Korean military officer who is just outside of Kim’s inner circle to propose an understanding with Beijing whereby, as soon as a coup d’état is accomplished, Beijing would recognize a new government consisting of a single socialist party with ‘market tendencies.’ In other words, the new Pyongyang government would be a mini-version of the current Chinese Communist Party, allowing capitalism to bloom while monopolizing political power.

Should there be a domestic military reaction to the new North Korean leadership, Beijing could simply take a page from its centuries-old playbook and send the People’s Liberation Army back into its unstable neighbor to back the new regime. Prior to Pyongyang's disclosure of developing nuclear weapons, China would have faced major worldwide censure for taking such an action. However, in the post 9/11 world, such a maneuver may be accepted and possibly praised by the majority of the world community as a preemptive act to prevent nuclear weapons ending up in the hands of international terrorists. If that happens, Beijing may be tempted to temporarily occupy all of North Korea and open negotiations with the US or perhaps a Six Party-style arrangement with a goal of not only denuclearizing the Korean peninsula but also possibly demilitarizing the two Koreas through phased withdrawals of both the PLA and USFK.

Regardless of whether Chinese troops are needed, a new Pyongyang government could immediately benefit from recognition by Tokyo that would lead to the payment of delayed colonial reparations. The new leaders would likely be able to comply with Tokyo’s demands for accountability for past kidnapped Japanese citizens, since they could disclaim any responsibility for the sins of their predecessors.

Chinese, US and South Korean aid would not only continue but likely increase, with assistance now addressing long-term solutions rather than expensive band aids. North Koreans would then be less compelled to leave their homeland, relieving China of more refugee headaches. South Korea would also face a much smaller inflow of North Korean refugees. Given the South’s inability to effectively assimilate the mere 6,000 refugees in the South today, the major social, economic and political calamity which would result from premature unification by absorption will have been avoided.

US Forces Korea would likely not challenge any regime change, or even the PLA’s incursion into North Korea, so long as it is certain that troop movements would stay north of the DMZ. While there would definitely be long-term strategic concerns over the new balance of power between Chinese and US hegemonies in NE Asia, the US would do its best to avoid a land war with China.

This scenario could turn disastrous if North Korean military forces irrationally rained a major fusillade of cannon and missile fire down on Seoul as the last gasp of a dying dynasty. The odds of such an order being given -- and acted upon -- are beyond anyone’s estimation.

This scenario would obviously be a major setback for South Korea’s current foreign policy. The South’s influence over eventual reunification would be significantly reduced from what it is today. The primary drawback of this kind of move by China could be the end of practical hopes for reunifying Korea in the foreseeable future. It may be helpful to remember that during most of Korea’s history it has not been a truly unified country. Even before 1945 there was strong regional hostility between the northern and southern Korean populations. That distrust has only increased, and most North Korean refugees in the South today face harsh discrimination, despite their often best efforts to assimilate.

Six months ago there was an academic brouhaha generated by China’s claim that Koguryo was an ancient Chinese kingdom, since half of it was in what is now Manchuria and the other half covered most of present day North Korea. One must be suspicious of China ’s long-term strategy in unleashing that certain controversy back then. It may have been the first, seemingly harmless step toward returning Korea to its direct sphere of influence.

It seems highly likely there will eventually be a contested struggle between China and the US for influence in this part of the world, with Korea being a prime candidate to become the venue. This struggle may be viewed as simply a clash between two super powers’ national interests. Or, in the bigger view, it may become the most important struggle of the 21st century -- between Old World, one-party government traditions and the New World’s relatively revolutionary, multi-party liberal democracies.

Whatever happens in the coming 12 or more months, the safest of all predictions is that the Koreans are going to face a rude awakening -- or a reminder -- that they are not in control of their fate. Call it the ‘Korean Tragedy’ or the recognition of realpolitik, but for centuries Korea has not been a master of its own destiny, and it increasingly appears that the prospects of its achieving self determination are once again being thwarted by its powerful neighbors.

 

North Korea to 'Implode' within a Year: U.S. Conservative
http://english.yna.co.kr/Engnews/20041224/320000000020041224100913E3.html

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Michael Horowitz

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is doomed to collapse within a year, a conservative U.S. scholar said on Thursday.

"North Korea will implode before next Christmas and (its leader) Kim Jong-il shall not enjoy Christmas next year," Michael Horowitz, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Hudson Institute, said in a speech.

Horowitz is known as one of the most influential U.S. conservatives on the country's policy toward North Korea. He visited South Korea early this month to criticize President Roh Moo-hyun's peace policy toward Pyongyang and insist on the need for a change of regime in the North.

The fall of the North Korean regime will come automatically as it is historically inevitable for a communist regime to collapse, Horowitz said.

He also mentioned the possibility of a military coup in the North.

When it finds North Korean generals who can be trusted to close concentration camps and scrap Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs, the scholar said, Washington could send a message to them, saying that if they "do something" it will receive support from the United States.

He said he is sure that China has already selected a North Korean general to succeed current leader Kim Jong-il as the political costs of Kim's remaining in power grows increasingly.

Beijing has reviewed a scenario in which the general would seize control, declare a national crisis and request China to send 200,000 troops to complete the coup d'etat, he said.

As for the passing by the U.S. of the North Korea Human Rights Act, the scholar noted that the U.S. Senate passed a stronger version of the bill than that passed by the House of Representatives in September with unanimous consent.

The act allows Washington to spend up to US$24 million annually during the 2005-2008 period to help improve the human rights situation in North Korea and help people fleeing the country.

"This was a strong signal to end this apartheid regime," he said.